关于海洋调查、科研业务实行收费和留成管理办法暂行规定的通知
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关于海洋调查、科研业务实行收费和留成管理办法暂行规定的通知
关于海洋调查、科研业务实行收费和留成管理办法暂行规定的通知
1980年2月23日，国家海洋局
各分局、研究所，各直供单位：
为了加强经济管理，按照经济规律办事，适当扩大各单位的财权，开阔财源，增加收入，促进海洋事业的发展，确定从一九八○年起对海洋调查、科研业务等实行收费和留成管理办法。经财政部审查同意，现将《关于海洋调查、科研业务收费留成管理办法暂行规定》发给你们。试行中有什么问题和意见希及时反映，以便进一步改进。
关于海洋调查、科研业务收费留成管理办法暂行规定
为了加强经济管理，按照经济规律办事，适当扩大各单位的财权，把国家、集体和个人三者的利益结合起来，充分调动积极因素，提高现有设备的利用率、开阔财源、增加收入，促进海洋事业的发展。根据国家有关规定和我局的实际情况，现对调查科研业务外协等实行收费和分成留用管理办法，暂行规定如下：
一、收费范围和内容
在保证按规定完成局统一计划下达的年度海洋调查、科研等任务的前提下，为充分利用现有条件，挖掘潜力，广开财源，增加收入，今后各单位接受海洋局系统和局外单位的调查、科研、试制、试验、鉴定、计算、制图、照相、翻译、复制、印刷、发行、提供资料、气象服务；租借船只、车辆、仪器设备、出售科研成果、代培人员、招待住所等外协任务，应按照规定，进行成本核算，实行收费。
二、收费标准
接受外协项目的收费标准（不包括船只收费标准）由各分局、研究所制订，报局批准。
1．要有科学根据，按照既组织一定的收入而收费标准又不能过高，即有一定的标准制度而又简便易行和内外有别的原则制定。
2．凡是国内有可比照的项目，不论研制产品、试制产品、小批量生产产品，还是对外加工等其他服务项目，一律参照同类产品的价格和国家（或省、市）规定的同类标准定价。
3．船只收费标准由局统一制订。
4．无可比照的项目，根据实际消耗，按质论价合理作价，研制项目、试制产品，按实际成本费（直接构成产品实体的各种原材料、外构产品和半成品费、外协加工费，直接人工工资和按国家规定提取的福利费，为产品项目耗用的燃料动力费，所用仪器设备折旧及其它消耗性的费用）再加20￣30％的管理费计算定价；小批量产品和对外加工产品，按实际生产成本费再加15￣25％的管理费计算定价；调查、科研服务工作，按设备折旧率、平均耗用原材料、动力、直接人工工资等各种消耗费用加10￣20％管理费计算拟订收费标准。
5．对局内的收费标准，可按直接对外收费标准的80￣90％计算收费。
对一些研制项目、试制产品、小批量生产产品收费也可以根据情况，与使用单位共同商定并签订合同。
三、收入经费的使用和管理
1．各分局、研究所等单位要从收费中将成本费用冲抵当年预算包干经费的调查科研业务支出。其实际完成的纯收入（即收入减除为组织收入而支出的费用）20％交局，80％留归单位使用。留给单位的收入，主要用于海洋事业的发展。可以分为海洋事业发展基金、集体福利基金和奖励基金掌握开支使用。
海洋事业发展基金，用于添置调查科研需要的仪器、设备、材料、装备器材的维修保养，技术革新、改造，增拨工厂的资金，弥补调查科研事业经费，但不得用于基本建设投资。
集体福利基金，可用于增加职工集体福利事业和文化设施的开支。
奖励基金，用于奖励工作成绩好的集体和个人，发给职工的奖金，要贯彻多劳多得的原则，贡献大的多奖，贡献小的少奖，没有贡献的不奖，每年发奖的总额暂按一个月工资额度执行，待国家正式规定下达后，按国家规定执行。
2．为了鼓励各单位积极完成调查科研任务，提高管理水平，增收节支，把完成年度内应当完成的调查科研计划在80％以上；完成全年收入计划；支出不超过年度预算三项考核条件作为从纯收入中提取集体福利基金和奖励基金的依据。凡是全面完成上述三项考核条件的福利基金和奖励基金分别按纯收入数的15％和25％计提；完不成第一项的应少提集体福利基金和奖励基金各40％；完不成第二至三项的，每少完成一项应少提集体福利基金和奖励基金各30％。具体提成额应报局审批。各单位应按年编报收入计划上述各项收入必须实行统一管理。各主管业务部门应及时通知本单位财务部门，统一收纳，任何部门不得私设小钱柜。
实行调查科研业务收费留成管理办法，扩大了各单位的财权，也加重了各单位的责任。各单位对留成基金的使用，必须充分听取群众的意见，实行民主管理，接受群众监督。
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Chapter IV
Function of Panels: Art. 11 of the DSU
OUTLINE
I Introduction
II Application of Art. 11 as a General Standard of Review
III Review in “neither de novo nor total defence”
IV Allegation against Panels’ Standard of Review
V Exercise of Judicial Economy
I Introduction
The function of panels is expressly defined in Art. 11 of the DSU, which reads as follows:
“The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under this Understanding and the covered agreements. Accordingly, a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. Panels should consult regularly with the parties to the dispute and give them adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution.”
This provision suggests that the function of panels is to make an objective assessment such as to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. However, how do panels fulfill their functions as provided in Art. 11 of the DSU? It is the issue that we will touch on in this chapter. In this chapter, the author explores on the standard of review issue under the WTO, i.e. “an objective assessment”; as well as on the exercised judicial economy principle developed in panel’s review.
With regard to the standard of review issue, the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures have increasingly confronted questions concerning the degree to which an international body, under the GATT/WTO, should “second guess” a decision of a national government agency concerning economic regulations that are allegedly inconsistent with an international rule. It seems clear that the international agreement doesn’t permit a national government’s determination always to prevail, otherwise the international rules could be easily evaded or rendered ineffective. But should the international body approach the issues involved without any deference to the national government? It has been argued in the GATT/WTO proceedings that panels should respect national government determinations, up to some point. That “point” is the crucial issue that has sometimes been labelled the “standard of review”.1
Of course, this issue is not unique to the GATT/WTO. Naturally, the standard-of-review issue is one that many legal systems face. “The standard-of-review question is faced at least implicitly whenever sovereign members of a treaty yield interpretive and dispute settlement powers to international panels and tribunals. Moreover, as national economies become increasingly interdependent, and as the need for international cooperation and coordination accordingly becomes greater, the standard-of-review question will become increasingly important.” 2 And “it can be seen that the standard-of-review question is a recurring and delicate one, and one that to some extent goes to the core of an international procedure that must (in a rule-based system) assess a national government’s actions against treaty or other international norms”. 3
However, for the immediate purpose, we want to focus below on the more particular question of the proper standard of review for a WTO panel when it undertakes to examine a national government’s actions or rulings that engage the question of consistency with the various WTO agreements and are subject to the DSU procedures.
II Application of Art. 11 as a General Standard of Review
Under the WTO jurisprudence, it’s demonstrated that Art. 11 of the DSU has been applied as a general standard of review. Art. 11 suggests that the function of panels is to make “an objective assessment” so as to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements.
For example, in US-Shirts and Blouses (DS33), the Panel rules that, “although the DSU does not contain any specific reference to standards of review, we consider that Article 11 of the DSU which describes the parameters of the function of panels, is relevant here”. 4
And the application of Art. 11 as a general standard of review under the DSU is analyzed systematically in EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48) where the Appellate Body rules that: 5
“The first point that must be made in this connection, is that the SPS Agreement itself is silent on the matter of an appropriate standard of review for panels deciding upon SPS measures of a Member. Nor are there provisions in the DSU or any of the covered agreements (other than the Anti-Dumping Agreement) prescribing a particular standard of review. Only Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement has language on the standard of review to be employed by panels engaged in the ‘assessment of the facts of the matter’. We find no indication in the SPS Agreement of an intent on the part of the Members to adopt or incorporate into that Agreement the standard set out in Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Textually, Article 17.6(i) is specific to the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
[…]
We do not mean, however, to suggest that there is at present no standard of review applicable to the determination and assessment of the facts in proceedings under the SPS Agreement or under other covered agreements. In our view, Article 11 of the DSU bears directly on this matter and, in effect, articulates with great succinctness but with sufficient clarity the appropriate standard of review for panels in respect of both the ascertainment of facts and the legal characterization of such facts under the relevant agreements […]”
In sum, for all but one of the covered agreements, Art. 11 of the DSU sets forth the appropriate standard of review for panels. As stated on more than one occasion, Art. 11 of the DSU, and, in particular, its requirement that “a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”, sets forth the appropriate standard of review for panels examining the consistency or inconsistency of alleged measures under the WTO jurisprudence. And the only exception is the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, in which a specific provision, Art. 17.6, sets out a special standard of review for disputes arising under that Agreement（to be discussed in subsequent chapter）.6
III Review in “neither de novo nor total defence”
In EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48), in the view of the European Communities, “the principal alternative approaches to the problem of formulating the ‘proper standard of review’ so far as panels are concerned are two-fold. The first is designated as ‘de novo review’. This standard of review would allow a panel complete freedom to come to a different view than the competent authority of the Member whose act or determination is being reviewed. A panel would have to ‘verify whether the determination by the national authority was…correct (both factually and procedurally)’. The second is described as ‘deference’. Under a ‘deference’ standard, a panel, in the submission of the European Communities, should not seek to redo the investigation conducted by the national authority but instead examine whether the ‘procedure’ required by the relevant WTO rules had been followed”.7 In this respect, the Appellate Body rules that:8
“So far as fact-finding by panels is concerned, their activities are always constrained by the mandate of Article 11 of the DSU: the applicable standard is neither de novo review as such, nor ‘total deference’, but rather the ‘objective assessment of the facts’. Many panels have in the past refused to undertake de novo review, wisely, since under current practice and systems, they are in any case poorly suited to engage in such a review. On the other hand, ‘total deference to the findings of the national authorities’, it has been well said, ‘could not ensure an 'objective assessment' as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU’.”
The ruling is confirmed on many other occasions. For example, the Panel on US-Underwear (DS24) finds that: 9
“In our opinion, a policy of total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an ‘objective assessment’ as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU. This conclusion is supported, in our view, by previous panel reports that have dealt with this issue, and most notably in the panel report on the ‘Transformers’ case.
The panel in the ‘Transformers’ case was confronted with the argument of New Zealand that the determination of ‘material injury’ by the competent New Zealand investigating authority could not be scrutinized by the panel. The ‘Transformers’ panel responded to this argument as follows:
‘The Panel agreed that the responsibility to make a determination of material injury caused by dumped imports rested in the first place with the authorities of the importing contracting party concerned. However, the Panel could not share the view that such a determination could not be scrutinized if it were challenged by another contracting party. On the contrary, the Panel believed that if a contracting party affected by the determination could make a case that the importation could not in itself have the effect of causing material injury to the industry in question, that contracting party was entitled, under the relevant GATT provisions and in particular Article XXIII, that its representations be given sympathetic consideration and that eventually, if no satisfactory adjustment was effected, it might refer the matter to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, as had been done by Finland in the present case. To conclude otherwise would give governments complete freedom and unrestricted discretion in deciding anti-dumping cases without any possibility to review the action taken in the GATT. This would lead to an unacceptable situation under the aspect of law and order in international trade relations as governed by the GATT’.”
In short, for the panel to adopt a policy of total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an “objective assessment” as foreseen by Art. 11 of the DSU. This conclusion is supported, in our view, by previous panel reports that have dealt with this issue. However, panels do not see their review as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating authorities, either. For example, in Argentina-Footwear (DS121), the Panel doesn’t consider that they have the mandate to conduct a de novo review: 10
“This approach is consistent with the reports of panels reviewing national investigations… The panel on United States - Anti-dumping Duties on Import of Salmon from Norway concluded that it should not engage in a de novo review of the evidence examined by the national investigating authority.
The panel on United States - Underwear followed this approach by noting, however, that it did not see its ‘review as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating authorities or by the Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB). Rather…the Panel's function should be to assess objectively the review conducted by the national investigating authority, in this case the CITA. We draw particular attention to the fact that a series of panel reports in the anti-dumping and subsidies/countervailing duties context have made it clear that it is not the role of panels to engage in a de novo review. In our view, the same is true for panels operating in the context of the ATC, since they would be called upon, as in the cases dealing with anti-dumping and/or subsidies/countervailing duties, to review the consistency of a determination by a national investigating authority imposing a restriction under the relevant provisions of the relevant WTO legal instruments, in this case the ATC. …’
Accordingly, the panel on United States - Underwear decided, ‘in accordance with Article 11 of the DSU, to make an objective assessment of the Statement issued by the US authorities … which, as the parties to the dispute agreed, constitutes the scope of the matter properly before the Panel without, however, engaging in a de novo review. … an objective assessment would entail an examination of whether the CITA had examined all relevant facts before it, whether adequate explanation had been provided of how the facts as a whole supported the determination made, and, consequently, whether the determination made was consistent with the international obligations of the United States’.
The panel on United States - Shirts and Blouses also stated that ‘[t]his is not to say that the Panel interprets the ATC as imposing on the importing Member any specific method either for collecting data or for considering and weighing all the relevant economic factors upon which the importing Member will decide whether there is need for a safeguard restraint. The relative importance of particular factors including those listed in Article 6.3 of the ATC is for each Member to assess in the light of the circumstances of each case’.
These past GATT and WTO panel reports make it clear that panels examining national investigations in the context of the application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties, as well as safeguards under the ATC, have refrained from engaging in a de novo review of the evidence examined by the national authority.”
However, as emphasized by the Appellate Body, although panels are not entitled to conduct a de novo review of the evidence, nor to substitute their own conclusions for those of the competent authorities, this does not mean that panels must simply accept the conclusions of the competent authorities. In this respect, the phrase “de novo review” should not be used loosely. If a panel concludes that the competent authorities, in a particular case, have not provided a reasoned or adequate explanation for their determination, that panel has not, thereby, engaged in a de novo review. Nor has that panel substituted its own conclusions for those of the competent authorities. Rather, the panel has, consistent with its obligations under the DSU, simply reached a conclusion that the determination made by the competent authorities is inconsistent with the specific requirements of the covered Agreement. 11
江苏省徐州市人民政府
《徐州市人民政府规章制定程序规定》
徐州市人民政府令
第110号
《徐州市人民政府规章制定程序规定》已经2006年6月20日市人民政府第62次常务会议通过，现予公布，自 2006年8月1日起施行。
代市长曹新平
二oo六年七月八日
徐州市人民政府规章制定程序规定
第一章 总 则
第一条 为规范本市政府规章(以下称“规章”)的制定工作，保证规章质量，根据《中华人民共和国立法法》、国务院《规章制定程序条例》和《规章备案条例》等有关法律、法规，结合本市实际，制定本规定。
第二条 本规定所称规章，是指市政府根据法律、法规，按照规定程序制定，以市政府令形式公布，用以规范行政行为，调整行政机关与公民、法人或者其他组织之间关系，适用于本市行政区域内、具有普遍约束力的规范性文件。
第三条 规章的立项、起草、审查、决定、公布、备案、解释，适用本规定。
第四条 制定规章，应当遵循下列原则：
(一)依照法定的权限和程序制定，符合宪法、法律、行政法规和其他上位法的规定；
(二)符合精简、统一、科学、效能的原则，简化行政管理手续，促进政府职能向经济调节、社会管理和公共服务转变；
(三)体现行政机关的职权与责任相统一的原则，切实保障公民、法人和其他组织的合法权益；
(四)立足全局，为经济建设、社会发展和改革开放服务，具有较强的针对性和效用性；
(五)充分调查研究，反映客观规律，使规章具有相对的稳定性、连续性、可操作性，符合本市实际，解决本地实际问题；
(六)上位法已经明确规定的内容，规章原则上不作重复规定。
第五条 规章的制定应当符合下列立法技术要求：
(一)名称可以称“规定”、“办法”、“实施细则”或“实施办法”，但不得称“条例”；
(二)内容应当明确、具体，采用条文方式表达，根据内容的需要可以分章、节、条、款、项、目；
(三)结构严谨、条理清晰，用语准确、简洁；
(四)符合其他立法技术规范的要求。
第六条 徐州市人民政府法制办公室(以下称市政府法制机构)具体负责规章的制定工作，履行下列职责：
(一)负责编制规章制定年度计划草案；
(二)组织起草、审查、修改、协调、论证规章草案；
(三)监督检查、评估规章的执行情况；
(四)组织协调、论证规章的修改、废止工作；
(五)具体承办规章的解释工作；
(六)法律、法规规定的其他职责。
各县(市、区)政府、市政府各部门及有关单位应当按照职责分工，协助、配合市政府法制机构共同做好规章草案的起草、论证和制定过程中的相关工作。
第二章立项
第七条 制定规章应当立项。
市政府所属工作部门或者县(市)、区人民政府认为需要制定规章的，应当以书面形式向市政府法制机构报请立项。本市其他机关、团体、企事业单位和公民可以以书面形式向市政府法制机构提出制定规章的立项建议。
第八条 规章立项申请应当包括下列内容：
(一)制定的必要性和可行性；
(二)所要解决的主要问题和拟确立的主要制度；
(三)所依据的法律、法规、规章和其他规定；
(四)起草单位或个人的调研和准备情况。
规章立项申请应当于每年十月底向市政府法制机构报送。
第九条 市政府法制机构应当对规章立项申请(建议)汇总研究，在调查研究的基础上，结合经济和社会发展的实际需要，突出重点，统筹兼顾，于每年年底前拟定下一年度规章立法计划并报市政府批准后执行。
拟制定的规章涉及问题复杂的，市政府法制机构应当组织召开立项论证会进行论证；必要的，应当进行立法成本效益分析、预测。
拟制定的规章项目广泛涉及公民、法人和其他组织权利和义务的，市政府法制机构可以向社会公布规章立法计划草案，征求意见。
第十条 规章年度立法计划应当包括制定项目、预备项目、起草单位、完成时间。
制定项目是指经论证、比较成熟的当年上报市政府常务会议审议的项目；预备项目是指当年进行调研、论证，待条件成熟时，按计划提交市政府常务会议审议的项目。
第十一条 市政府法制机构应当对有关单位执行规章年度立法计划的情况进行检查、督促、指导和协调，并负责按计划完成审查任务和所承担的起草任务。
第十二条 未列入规章立法计划的项目，一般不予办理。确因形势发展或者工作变化，需要调整计划或者增加项目的，有关单位应当依照本规定第七、八条的规定报送立项申请，由市政府法制机构会同有关部门研究论证后向市政府提出是否予以调整的建议，经分管法制工作副市长和市长批准后予以执行。
市政府法制机构也可以根据实际需要，向市政府提出调整立法计划的建议。
确因特殊情况，未能完成的制定项目，可以列入下一年度的．规章立法计划。
第三章起草
第十三条 规章可以由市政府确定一个单位或者几个单位具体承担起草工作，也可以确定由市政府法制机构直接起草或者组织起草。
起草规章，可以邀请个人、组织参加，也可以委托个人或组织起草。
第十四条 起草单位应当成立规章起草小组，制定起草计划、落实起草人员、明确责任分工，按时完成任务。不能完成起草工作的，应当书面报告市政府法制机构，并说明理由。
第十五条 起草规章，应当深入调查研究，总结实践经验，广泛听取社会各方面的意见。听取意见可以采取书面征求意见、召开座谈会、论证会、听证会以及媒体发布等形式。
起草单位可以根据立法需要组织有关单位和人员开展专题考察、学习等调研活动。
起草规章过程中，市政府法制机构可以根据需要参与调研、论证，提出建议和意见。
第十六条 起草的规章直接涉及公民、法人和其他组织切身利益，或者有关单位、组织、公民对其有重大意见分歧的，起草单位应当向社会公布，征求社会各界的意见，也可以举行听证会。
第十七条 起草规章，涉及市政府其他部门职责或者与其他部门关系密切的，起草单位应当征求其他部门的意见；其他部门应当认真研究，并按起草单位要求的时间反馈书面意见。
起草单位与其他部门有不同意见的，应当协商；经协商仍不能取得一致意见的，起草单位应当在报送规章送审稿时如实说明情况和理由。
第十八条 起草单位向市政府报送规章送审稿，应当同时附带送审稿说明、立法依据对照表及其电子文本和其他有关材料。
规章送审稿应当经起草单位主要负责人签署并加盖单位印章。
规章送审稿说明应当包括拟规范事项的现状和主要问题、立法依据、确立的主要制度、征求意见及协商结果、听证会情况等内容。
其他有关材料应当包括有关方面反馈意见的原件，立法所参考的相关文件依据、整理后的听证会笔录，以及市政府法制机构要求提供的其他相关资料。
第四章审查
第十九条 规章送审稿由市政府法制机构负责统一审查。审查内容主要包括：
(一)是否符合本规定对立法原则、，起草程序的要求；
(二)是否与有关法规、规章协调、衔接；
(三)规(设)定的行政许可、行政处罚、行政强制措施、收费以及其他行政措施是否合法且确有必要；
(四)对各方面意见的处理是否合法、适当；
(五)是否符合立法技术要求；
(六)需要审查的其他内容。
第二十条 市政府法制机构应当在收到规章送审稿十个工作日内进行初步审查。
经初步审查，发现规章送审稿有下列情况之一的，市政府法制机构可以暂缓办理或者退回起草单位重新起草：
(一)未列入年度立法工作计划且未按本规定第十二条第一款规定办理的；
(二)制定的基本条件尚不成熟的；
(三)所依据的主要上位法即将出台或者即将修改的；
(四)有关方面对送审稿规定的主要内容存在较大争议，起草单位未与有关方面协商的；
(五)不符合本规定第十八条规定的。
第二十一条 市政府法制机构应当将规章送审稿书面征求市政府有关部门、县(市、区)人民政府的意见。市政府有关部门、县(市、区)人民政府应当按照市政府法制机构要求的时间反馈书面意见； 因故不能按时反馈书面意见的，应当及时向市政府法制机构说明理由。
逾期未反馈意见也未说明理由的，视为对该规章送审稿无异议。
对涉及社会公共利益和群众利益的规章送审稿，应当通过网络等形式广泛征求社会公众意见。必要时，深入基层进行实地调查研究，听取包括管理相对人在内的各方面意见。
对重要的、专业性较强的、涉及主要问题有意见分歧的规章送审稿，市政府法制机构可以书面征求立法咨询员意见，或者组织召开座谈会、论证会、听证会等，充分听取意见，研究论证。
前款规定的听证会的程序，由市政府根据国务院《规章制定程序条例》规定另行制定。
第二十二条 市政府法制机构可以就送审稿中涉及的主要措施、管理体制、权限分工等有关问题进行协调，经协调仍不能达成一致意见的，市政府法制机构应当将争议的问题、有关部门的意见以及本部门的意见报市政府决定。
第二十三条 市政府法制机构应当在充分研究、吸纳各方面意见的基础上，对规章送审稿进行修改并形成规章草案及草案说明。
草案说明应当包括下列内容：
(一)制定规章的目的、必要性，拟解决的主要问题及其解决措施的可行性；
(二)制定规章所依据的法律、法规及参考的有关文件；
(三)征求各方面的意见及意见协调情况；
(四)规章确立的主要制度及主要条款内容；
(五)其他需要说明的问题。
第二十四条 规章草案及草案说明应当经市政府法制机构办公会议讨论，由主要负责人签署，并提出提请市政府常务会议或者全体会议审议的建议。
第二十五条 规章草案及草案说明经市政府领导同意提请市政府常务会议或者全体会议审议的，市政府法制机构、起草单位应当做好有关汇报准备工作。
起草单位应当根据格式和数量要求，印制规章草案、草案说明及对照表。
第五章 决定与公布
第二十六条 规章必须经市政府常务会议或者全体会议讨论通过。
市政府常务会议或者全体会议审议规章草案时，由市政府法制机构 第二十七条 规章草案经市政府常务会议或者全体会议审议通过后，由市政府法制机构根据会议的审议意见，组织、协调有关部门和单位进行修改，形成草案修改稿，报请市长签署。
对市政府常务会议或市政府全体会议未通过的规章草案，由市政府法制机构督促起草单位按照会议决定及时办理。
第二十八条 规章由市长签署命令公布。
公布规章的命令应当载明制定机关、序号、规章名称、通过日期、施行日期、市长署名以及公布日期。
第二十九条 规章应当自公布之日起三十日后施行。但是，公布后不立即施行将有碍规章施行的，可以自公布之日起施行。
第三十条 规章公布后应当在(徐州市人民政府公报》、《徐州日报》、市政府网站上全文刊登。
《徐州市人民政府公报》上刊登的规章文本为标准文本。
规章公布后的新闻发布及宣传等，由市政府法制机构会同起草单位组织、协调。
第六章 备案和监督
第三十一条 规章应当自公布之日起三十日内，政府法制机构按照要求向国务院、省人大常委会、府、市人大常委会备案。
第三十二条 规章实施一个年度后的第一个季度，执行部门应当向市政府法制机构书面报告实施情况。
市政府法制机构应当会同执行部门定期对规章的实施情况进行检查、评估，并对实施过程中发现的问题及时研究、处理。评估的内容包括必要性、有效性、效益性和公平性。
第三十三条 国家机关、社会团体、企事业组织、公民认为规章同宪法、法律、行政法规和其他上位法相抵触的，可以向市政府书面提出审查的建议，由市政府法制机构研究、处理。
第七章 解释、修改和废止
第三十四条 规章有下列情况之一的，由市政府解释：
(一)规章的规定需要进一步明确具体含义的；
(二)规章制定后出现新的情况，需要明确适用规章依据的。
规章的解释，由市政府法制机构研究并提出意见，经市人民政府批准后公布。
规章的解释同规章具有同等效力。
第三十五条 规章有下列情形之一的，有关部门应当及时提出修改或者废止的建议：
(一)依据的上位法已经修改或者废止的；
(二)主要内容已被新公布的上位法或者其他有关规章替代的；
(三)调整对象已经消失或者规范的内容已不适应社会实际需要的；
(四)市政府认为有必要进行修改或者废止的。
规章的修改、废止程序，参照规章制定程序的有关规定执行。
第三十六条 规章的正式版本(外文版本)的汇编，由市政府法制机构负责。
第八章附则
第三十七条 地方性法规草案在市政府起草、审查、审议阶段的程序，参照本规定的有关内容执行。
第三十八条规章制定、汇编所需经费，应当由财政部门列入专项预算，并予以保证。市政府法制机构应当合理调配、统筹安排。
第三十九条 本规定自2006年8月1日起施行。
Function of Panels: Art. 11 of the DSU
OUTLINE
I Introduction
II Application of Art. 11 as a General Standard of Review
III Review in “neither de novo nor total defence”
IV Allegation against Panels’ Standard of Review
V Exercise of Judicial Economy
I Introduction
The function of panels is expressly defined in Art. 11 of the DSU, which reads as follows:
“The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under this Understanding and the covered agreements. Accordingly, a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. Panels should consult regularly with the parties to the dispute and give them adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution.”
This provision suggests that the function of panels is to make an objective assessment such as to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. However, how do panels fulfill their functions as provided in Art. 11 of the DSU? It is the issue that we will touch on in this chapter. In this chapter, the author explores on the standard of review issue under the WTO, i.e. “an objective assessment”; as well as on the exercised judicial economy principle developed in panel’s review.
With regard to the standard of review issue, the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures have increasingly confronted questions concerning the degree to which an international body, under the GATT/WTO, should “second guess” a decision of a national government agency concerning economic regulations that are allegedly inconsistent with an international rule. It seems clear that the international agreement doesn’t permit a national government’s determination always to prevail, otherwise the international rules could be easily evaded or rendered ineffective. But should the international body approach the issues involved without any deference to the national government? It has been argued in the GATT/WTO proceedings that panels should respect national government determinations, up to some point. That “point” is the crucial issue that has sometimes been labelled the “standard of review”.1
Of course, this issue is not unique to the GATT/WTO. Naturally, the standard-of-review issue is one that many legal systems face. “The standard-of-review question is faced at least implicitly whenever sovereign members of a treaty yield interpretive and dispute settlement powers to international panels and tribunals. Moreover, as national economies become increasingly interdependent, and as the need for international cooperation and coordination accordingly becomes greater, the standard-of-review question will become increasingly important.” 2 And “it can be seen that the standard-of-review question is a recurring and delicate one, and one that to some extent goes to the core of an international procedure that must (in a rule-based system) assess a national government’s actions against treaty or other international norms”. 3
However, for the immediate purpose, we want to focus below on the more particular question of the proper standard of review for a WTO panel when it undertakes to examine a national government’s actions or rulings that engage the question of consistency with the various WTO agreements and are subject to the DSU procedures.
II Application of Art. 11 as a General Standard of Review
Under the WTO jurisprudence, it’s demonstrated that Art. 11 of the DSU has been applied as a general standard of review. Art. 11 suggests that the function of panels is to make “an objective assessment” so as to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements.
For example, in US-Shirts and Blouses (DS33), the Panel rules that, “although the DSU does not contain any specific reference to standards of review, we consider that Article 11 of the DSU which describes the parameters of the function of panels, is relevant here”. 4
And the application of Art. 11 as a general standard of review under the DSU is analyzed systematically in EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48) where the Appellate Body rules that: 5
“The first point that must be made in this connection, is that the SPS Agreement itself is silent on the matter of an appropriate standard of review for panels deciding upon SPS measures of a Member. Nor are there provisions in the DSU or any of the covered agreements (other than the Anti-Dumping Agreement) prescribing a particular standard of review. Only Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement has language on the standard of review to be employed by panels engaged in the ‘assessment of the facts of the matter’. We find no indication in the SPS Agreement of an intent on the part of the Members to adopt or incorporate into that Agreement the standard set out in Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Textually, Article 17.6(i) is specific to the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
[…]
We do not mean, however, to suggest that there is at present no standard of review applicable to the determination and assessment of the facts in proceedings under the SPS Agreement or under other covered agreements. In our view, Article 11 of the DSU bears directly on this matter and, in effect, articulates with great succinctness but with sufficient clarity the appropriate standard of review for panels in respect of both the ascertainment of facts and the legal characterization of such facts under the relevant agreements […]”
In sum, for all but one of the covered agreements, Art. 11 of the DSU sets forth the appropriate standard of review for panels. As stated on more than one occasion, Art. 11 of the DSU, and, in particular, its requirement that “a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”, sets forth the appropriate standard of review for panels examining the consistency or inconsistency of alleged measures under the WTO jurisprudence. And the only exception is the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, in which a specific provision, Art. 17.6, sets out a special standard of review for disputes arising under that Agreement（to be discussed in subsequent chapter）.6
III Review in “neither de novo nor total defence”
In EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48), in the view of the European Communities, “the principal alternative approaches to the problem of formulating the ‘proper standard of review’ so far as panels are concerned are two-fold. The first is designated as ‘de novo review’. This standard of review would allow a panel complete freedom to come to a different view than the competent authority of the Member whose act or determination is being reviewed. A panel would have to ‘verify whether the determination by the national authority was…correct (both factually and procedurally)’. The second is described as ‘deference’. Under a ‘deference’ standard, a panel, in the submission of the European Communities, should not seek to redo the investigation conducted by the national authority but instead examine whether the ‘procedure’ required by the relevant WTO rules had been followed”.7 In this respect, the Appellate Body rules that:8
“So far as fact-finding by panels is concerned, their activities are always constrained by the mandate of Article 11 of the DSU: the applicable standard is neither de novo review as such, nor ‘total deference’, but rather the ‘objective assessment of the facts’. Many panels have in the past refused to undertake de novo review, wisely, since under current practice and systems, they are in any case poorly suited to engage in such a review. On the other hand, ‘total deference to the findings of the national authorities’, it has been well said, ‘could not ensure an 'objective assessment' as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU’.”
The ruling is confirmed on many other occasions. For example, the Panel on US-Underwear (DS24) finds that: 9
“In our opinion, a policy of total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an ‘objective assessment’ as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU. This conclusion is supported, in our view, by previous panel reports that have dealt with this issue, and most notably in the panel report on the ‘Transformers’ case.
The panel in the ‘Transformers’ case was confronted with the argument of New Zealand that the determination of ‘material injury’ by the competent New Zealand investigating authority could not be scrutinized by the panel. The ‘Transformers’ panel responded to this argument as follows:
‘The Panel agreed that the responsibility to make a determination of material injury caused by dumped imports rested in the first place with the authorities of the importing contracting party concerned. However, the Panel could not share the view that such a determination could not be scrutinized if it were challenged by another contracting party. On the contrary, the Panel believed that if a contracting party affected by the determination could make a case that the importation could not in itself have the effect of causing material injury to the industry in question, that contracting party was entitled, under the relevant GATT provisions and in particular Article XXIII, that its representations be given sympathetic consideration and that eventually, if no satisfactory adjustment was effected, it might refer the matter to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, as had been done by Finland in the present case. To conclude otherwise would give governments complete freedom and unrestricted discretion in deciding anti-dumping cases without any possibility to review the action taken in the GATT. This would lead to an unacceptable situation under the aspect of law and order in international trade relations as governed by the GATT’.”
In short, for the panel to adopt a policy of total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an “objective assessment” as foreseen by Art. 11 of the DSU. This conclusion is supported, in our view, by previous panel reports that have dealt with this issue. However, panels do not see their review as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating authorities, either. For example, in Argentina-Footwear (DS121), the Panel doesn’t consider that they have the mandate to conduct a de novo review: 10
“This approach is consistent with the reports of panels reviewing national investigations… The panel on United States - Anti-dumping Duties on Import of Salmon from Norway concluded that it should not engage in a de novo review of the evidence examined by the national investigating authority.
The panel on United States - Underwear followed this approach by noting, however, that it did not see its ‘review as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating authorities or by the Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB). Rather…the Panel's function should be to assess objectively the review conducted by the national investigating authority, in this case the CITA. We draw particular attention to the fact that a series of panel reports in the anti-dumping and subsidies/countervailing duties context have made it clear that it is not the role of panels to engage in a de novo review. In our view, the same is true for panels operating in the context of the ATC, since they would be called upon, as in the cases dealing with anti-dumping and/or subsidies/countervailing duties, to review the consistency of a determination by a national investigating authority imposing a restriction under the relevant provisions of the relevant WTO legal instruments, in this case the ATC. …’
Accordingly, the panel on United States - Underwear decided, ‘in accordance with Article 11 of the DSU, to make an objective assessment of the Statement issued by the US authorities … which, as the parties to the dispute agreed, constitutes the scope of the matter properly before the Panel without, however, engaging in a de novo review. … an objective assessment would entail an examination of whether the CITA had examined all relevant facts before it, whether adequate explanation had been provided of how the facts as a whole supported the determination made, and, consequently, whether the determination made was consistent with the international obligations of the United States’.
The panel on United States - Shirts and Blouses also stated that ‘[t]his is not to say that the Panel interprets the ATC as imposing on the importing Member any specific method either for collecting data or for considering and weighing all the relevant economic factors upon which the importing Member will decide whether there is need for a safeguard restraint. The relative importance of particular factors including those listed in Article 6.3 of the ATC is for each Member to assess in the light of the circumstances of each case’.
These past GATT and WTO panel reports make it clear that panels examining national investigations in the context of the application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties, as well as safeguards under the ATC, have refrained from engaging in a de novo review of the evidence examined by the national authority.”
However, as emphasized by the Appellate Body, although panels are not entitled to conduct a de novo review of the evidence, nor to substitute their own conclusions for those of the competent authorities, this does not mean that panels must simply accept the conclusions of the competent authorities. In this respect, the phrase “de novo review” should not be used loosely. If a panel concludes that the competent authorities, in a particular case, have not provided a reasoned or adequate explanation for their determination, that panel has not, thereby, engaged in a de novo review. Nor has that panel substituted its own conclusions for those of the competent authorities. Rather, the panel has, consistent with its obligations under the DSU, simply reached a conclusion that the determination made by the competent authorities is inconsistent with the specific requirements of the covered Agreement. 11
徐州市人民政府规章制定程序规定
《徐州市人民政府规章制定程序规定》
徐州市人民政府令
第110号
《徐州市人民政府规章制定程序规定》已经2006年6月20日市人民政府第62次常务会议通过，现予公布，自 2006年8月1日起施行。
代市长曹新平
二oo六年七月八日
徐州市人民政府规章制定程序规定
第一章 总 则
第一条 为规范本市政府规章(以下称“规章”)的制定工作，保证规章质量，根据《中华人民共和国立法法》、国务院《规章制定程序条例》和《规章备案条例》等有关法律、法规，结合本市实际，制定本规定。
第二条 本规定所称规章，是指市政府根据法律、法规，按照规定程序制定，以市政府令形式公布，用以规范行政行为，调整行政机关与公民、法人或者其他组织之间关系，适用于本市行政区域内、具有普遍约束力的规范性文件。
第三条 规章的立项、起草、审查、决定、公布、备案、解释，适用本规定。
第四条 制定规章，应当遵循下列原则：
(一)依照法定的权限和程序制定，符合宪法、法律、行政法规和其他上位法的规定；
(二)符合精简、统一、科学、效能的原则，简化行政管理手续，促进政府职能向经济调节、社会管理和公共服务转变；
(三)体现行政机关的职权与责任相统一的原则，切实保障公民、法人和其他组织的合法权益；
(四)立足全局，为经济建设、社会发展和改革开放服务，具有较强的针对性和效用性；
(五)充分调查研究，反映客观规律，使规章具有相对的稳定性、连续性、可操作性，符合本市实际，解决本地实际问题；
(六)上位法已经明确规定的内容，规章原则上不作重复规定。
第五条 规章的制定应当符合下列立法技术要求：
(一)名称可以称“规定”、“办法”、“实施细则”或“实施办法”，但不得称“条例”；
(二)内容应当明确、具体，采用条文方式表达，根据内容的需要可以分章、节、条、款、项、目；
(三)结构严谨、条理清晰，用语准确、简洁；
(四)符合其他立法技术规范的要求。
第六条 徐州市人民政府法制办公室(以下称市政府法制机构)具体负责规章的制定工作，履行下列职责：
(一)负责编制规章制定年度计划草案；
(二)组织起草、审查、修改、协调、论证规章草案；
(三)监督检查、评估规章的执行情况；
(四)组织协调、论证规章的修改、废止工作；
(五)具体承办规章的解释工作；
(六)法律、法规规定的其他职责。
各县(市、区)政府、市政府各部门及有关单位应当按照职责分工，协助、配合市政府法制机构共同做好规章草案的起草、论证和制定过程中的相关工作。
第二章立项
第七条 制定规章应当立项。
市政府所属工作部门或者县(市)、区人民政府认为需要制定规章的，应当以书面形式向市政府法制机构报请立项。本市其他机关、团体、企事业单位和公民可以以书面形式向市政府法制机构提出制定规章的立项建议。
第八条 规章立项申请应当包括下列内容：
(一)制定的必要性和可行性；
(二)所要解决的主要问题和拟确立的主要制度；
(三)所依据的法律、法规、规章和其他规定；
(四)起草单位或个人的调研和准备情况。
规章立项申请应当于每年十月底向市政府法制机构报送。
第九条 市政府法制机构应当对规章立项申请(建议)汇总研究，在调查研究的基础上，结合经济和社会发展的实际需要，突出重点，统筹兼顾，于每年年底前拟定下一年度规章立法计划并报市政府批准后执行。
拟制定的规章涉及问题复杂的，市政府法制机构应当组织召开立项论证会进行论证；必要的，应当进行立法成本效益分析、预测。
拟制定的规章项目广泛涉及公民、法人和其他组织权利和义务的，市政府法制机构可以向社会公布规章立法计划草案，征求意见。
第十条 规章年度立法计划应当包括制定项目、预备项目、起草单位、完成时间。
制定项目是指经论证、比较成熟的当年上报市政府常务会议审议的项目；预备项目是指当年进行调研、论证，待条件成熟时，按计划提交市政府常务会议审议的项目。
第十一条 市政府法制机构应当对有关单位执行规章年度立法计划的情况进行检查、督促、指导和协调，并负责按计划完成审查任务和所承担的起草任务。
第十二条 未列入规章立法计划的项目，一般不予办理。确因形势发展或者工作变化，需要调整计划或者增加项目的，有关单位应当依照本规定第七、八条的规定报送立项申请，由市政府法制机构会同有关部门研究论证后向市政府提出是否予以调整的建议，经分管法制工作副市长和市长批准后予以执行。
市政府法制机构也可以根据实际需要，向市政府提出调整立法计划的建议。
确因特殊情况，未能完成的制定项目，可以列入下一年度的．规章立法计划。
第三章起草
第十三条 规章可以由市政府确定一个单位或者几个单位具体承担起草工作，也可以确定由市政府法制机构直接起草或者组织起草。
起草规章，可以邀请个人、组织参加，也可以委托个人或组织起草。
第十四条 起草单位应当成立规章起草小组，制定起草计划、落实起草人员、明确责任分工，按时完成任务。不能完成起草工作的，应当书面报告市政府法制机构，并说明理由。
第十五条 起草规章，应当深入调查研究，总结实践经验，广泛听取社会各方面的意见。听取意见可以采取书面征求意见、召开座谈会、论证会、听证会以及媒体发布等形式。
起草单位可以根据立法需要组织有关单位和人员开展专题考察、学习等调研活动。
起草规章过程中，市政府法制机构可以根据需要参与调研、论证，提出建议和意见。
第十六条 起草的规章直接涉及公民、法人和其他组织切身利益，或者有关单位、组织、公民对其有重大意见分歧的，起草单位应当向社会公布，征求社会各界的意见，也可以举行听证会。
第十七条 起草规章，涉及市政府其他部门职责或者与其他部门关系密切的，起草单位应当征求其他部门的意见；其他部门应当认真研究，并按起草单位要求的时间反馈书面意见。
起草单位与其他部门有不同意见的，应当协商；经协商仍不能取得一致意见的，起草单位应当在报送规章送审稿时如实说明情况和理由。
第十八条 起草单位向市政府报送规章送审稿，应当同时附带送审稿说明、立法依据对照表及其电子文本和其他有关材料。
规章送审稿应当经起草单位主要负责人签署并加盖单位印章。
规章送审稿说明应当包括拟规范事项的现状和主要问题、立法依据、确立的主要制度、征求意见及协商结果、听证会情况等内容。
其他有关材料应当包括有关方面反馈意见的原件，立法所参考的相关文件依据、整理后的听证会笔录，以及市政府法制机构要求提供的其他相关资料。
第四章审查
第十九条 规章送审稿由市政府法制机构负责统一审查。审查内容主要包括：
(一)是否符合本规定对立法原则、，起草程序的要求；
(二)是否与有关法规、规章协调、衔接；
(三)规(设)定的行政许可、行政处罚、行政强制措施、收费以及其他行政措施是否合法且确有必要；
(四)对各方面意见的处理是否合法、适当；
(五)是否符合立法技术要求；
(六)需要审查的其他内容。
第二十条 市政府法制机构应当在收到规章送审稿十个工作日内进行初步审查。
经初步审查，发现规章送审稿有下列情况之一的，市政府法制机构可以暂缓办理或者退回起草单位重新起草：
(一)未列入年度立法工作计划且未按本规定第十二条第一款规定办理的；
(二)制定的基本条件尚不成熟的；
(三)所依据的主要上位法即将出台或者即将修改的；
(四)有关方面对送审稿规定的主要内容存在较大争议，起草单位未与有关方面协商的；
(五)不符合本规定第十八条规定的。
第二十一条 市政府法制机构应当将规章送审稿书面征求市政府有关部门、县(市、区)人民政府的意见。市政府有关部门、县(市、区)人民政府应当按照市政府法制机构要求的时间反馈书面意见； 因故不能按时反馈书面意见的，应当及时向市政府法制机构说明理由。
逾期未反馈意见也未说明理由的，视为对该规章送审稿无异议。
对涉及社会公共利益和群众利益的规章送审稿，应当通过网络等形式广泛征求社会公众意见。必要时，深入基层进行实地调查研究，听取包括管理相对人在内的各方面意见。
对重要的、专业性较强的、涉及主要问题有意见分歧的规章送审稿，市政府法制机构可以书面征求立法咨询员意见，或者组织召开座谈会、论证会、听证会等，充分听取意见，研究论证。
前款规定的听证会的程序，由市政府根据国务院《规章制定程序条例》规定另行制定。
第二十二条 市政府法制机构可以就送审稿中涉及的主要措施、管理体制、权限分工等有关问题进行协调，经协调仍不能达成一致意见的，市政府法制机构应当将争议的问题、有关部门的意见以及本部门的意见报市政府决定。
第二十三条 市政府法制机构应当在充分研究、吸纳各方面意见的基础上，对规章送审稿进行修改并形成规章草案及草案说明。
草案说明应当包括下列内容：
(一)制定规章的目的、必要性，拟解决的主要问题及其解决措施的可行性；
(二)制定规章所依据的法律、法规及参考的有关文件；
(三)征求各方面的意见及意见协调情况；
(四)规章确立的主要制度及主要条款内容；
(五)其他需要说明的问题。
第二十四条 规章草案及草案说明应当经市政府法制机构办公会议讨论，由主要负责人签署，并提出提请市政府常务会议或者全体会议审议的建议。
第二十五条 规章草案及草案说明经市政府领导同意提请市政府常务会议或者全体会议审议的，市政府法制机构、起草单位应当做好有关汇报准备工作。
起草单位应当根据格式和数量要求，印制规章草案、草案说明及对照表。
第五章 决定与公布
第二十六条 规章必须经市政府常务会议或者全体会议讨论通过。
市政府常务会议或者全体会议审议规章草案时，由市政府法制机构 第二十七条 规章草案经市政府常务会议或者全体会议审议通过后，由市政府法制机构根据会议的审议意见，组织、协调有关部门和单位进行修改，形成草案修改稿，报请市长签署。
对市政府常务会议或市政府全体会议未通过的规章草案，由市政府法制机构督促起草单位按照会议决定及时办理。
第二十八条 规章由市长签署命令公布。
公布规章的命令应当载明制定机关、序号、规章名称、通过日期、施行日期、市长署名以及公布日期。
第二十九条 规章应当自公布之日起三十日后施行。但是，公布后不立即施行将有碍规章施行的，可以自公布之日起施行。
第三十条 规章公布后应当在(徐州市人民政府公报》、《徐州日报》、市政府网站上全文刊登。
《徐州市人民政府公报》上刊登的规章文本为标准文本。
规章公布后的新闻发布及宣传等，由市政府法制机构会同起草单位组织、协调。
第六章 备案和监督
第三十一条 规章应当自公布之日起三十日内，政府法制机构按照要求向国务院、省人大常委会、府、市人大常委会备案。
第三十二条 规章实施一个年度后的第一个季度，执行部门应当向市政府法制机构书面报告实施情况。
市政府法制机构应当会同执行部门定期对规章的实施情况进行检查、评估，并对实施过程中发现的问题及时研究、处理。评估的内容包括必要性、有效性、效益性和公平性。
第三十三条 国家机关、社会团体、企事业组织、公民认为规章同宪法、法律、行政法规和其他上位法相抵触的，可以向市政府书面提出审查的建议，由市政府法制机构研究、处理。
第七章 解释、修改和废止
第三十四条 规章有下列情况之一的，由市政府解释：
(一)规章的规定需要进一步明确具体含义的；
(二)规章制定后出现新的情况，需要明确适用规章依据的。
规章的解释，由市政府法制机构研究并提出意见，经市人民政府批准后公布。
规章的解释同规章具有同等效力。
第三十五条 规章有下列情形之一的，有关部门应当及时提出修改或者废止的建议：
(一)依据的上位法已经修改或者废止的；
(二)主要内容已被新公布的上位法或者其他有关规章替代的；
(三)调整对象已经消失或者规范的内容已不适应社会实际需要的；
(四)市政府认为有必要进行修改或者废止的。
规章的修改、废止程序，参照规章制定程序的有关规定执行。
第三十六条 规章的正式版本(外文版本)的汇编，由市政府法制机构负责。
第八章附则
第三十七条 地方性法规草案在市政府起草、审查、审议阶段的程序，参照本规定的有关内容执行。
第三十八条规章制定、汇编所需经费，应当由财政部门列入专项预算，并予以保证。市政府法制机构应当合理调配、统筹安排。
第三十九条 本规定自2006年8月1日起施行。
